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Disclosure and the cost of capital: what do 
we know? 
Christine A. Botosan* 
Abstract- Whether firms receive cost of capital benefits from greater disclosure is an important and controversial 
question. This paper reviews the relevant academic research that can provide insights into this question. In con- 
ducting this review, my primary objectives are to highlight the implications of existing research for accounting 
practitioners, standard setters, and academicians, and to address not only the question what do we know, but also 
the question what do we not know, yet? The overriding conclusion of existing theoretical and empirical research is 
that greater disclosure reduces cost of capital. Even so, several avenues for future research exist. 
1. Introduction 
Whether firms receive cost of capital benefits from 
greater disclosure is an important and controver- 
sial question for managers, capital market partici- 
pants, and standard setters. The Report of 
the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants' Special Committee on Financial 
Reporting (AICPA Report) (1994) identifies a 
lower cost of equity capital as an important bene- 
fit of greater disclosure, and Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) member, John ("eel') 
Foster (2003) argues that this relation is intuitive. 
But, all constituents do not share this view. For ex- 
ample, the Financial Executives Institute argues 
that the enhanced disclosures recommended in the 
AICPA Report would increase share price volatili- 
ty and risk, and lead to a higher cost of equity cap- 
ital', and interim reporting has long been the 
subject of similar criticisms. In light of the ongo- 
ing debate academic research can provide insights 
into the relation between disclosure and cost of 
capital. 
This paper reviews this academic research. I 
focus on the cost of equity capital since this cost 
component receives most of the attention in the lit- 
erature. However, I devote one section of the paper 
to empirical research that explores the association 
between disclosure and the cost of debt capital. In 
conducting this review, my primary objectives are 
to highlight the implications of existing research 
for accounting practitioners, standard setters, and 
academicians and to address not only the question 
what do we know, but also the question what do 
we not know, yet? 
A sizeable body of theoretical research examines 
the link between information and cost of equity 
*The author is Professor of Accounting, and C. Roland 
Christensen Faculty Fellow at the David Eccles School of 
Business, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 841 12. E- 
mail: actcb@business.utah.edu 
capital. Although the bulk of this literature sug- 
gests that greater disclosure reduces the cost of eq- 
uity capital, consensus has not been reached. The 
empirical literature has grown in recent years as 
researchers experiment with new methods for 
dealing with the thorny problems of estimating 
cost of equity capital and measuring disclosure. 
Most of this research concludes that greater dis- 
closure reduces cost of equity capital. Even so, a 
relatively early stream of research indicates that 
certain types of disclosure might have the opposite 
effect. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as fol- 
lows. Section 2 addresses two questions: What is 
the cost of equity capital? How is it measured? 
Section 3 reviews the theoretical research, and 
Section 4 reviews the empirical research, that links 
disclosure to the cost of capital. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper by summarising the findings 
of existing research and identifying open research 
questions. 
2. What is the cost of equity capital? How 
is it measured? 
2.1.  What is the cost of equity capital? 
The cost of equity capital (r) is the minimum rate 
of return equity investors require for providing 
capital to the firm. It is comprised of the risk free 
rate of interest (rf) and a premium for the firm's 
non-diversifiable risk (rprem) as shown in equation 
(1). 
' = ' j  -k 'prern (1) 
Cost of equity capital can also be described as 
the risk-adjusted discount rate that investors apply 
to expected future cash flows (E,(Div)) to arrive at 
current stock price (P,). This notion is captured by 
' Wall Street Journal, 16 August 1994. 
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32 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
the traditional dividend discount formula given by 
equation (2). 
(2) 
Cost of equity capital is sometimes referred to as 
the ‘expected’ cost of equity capital because it is a 
forward-looking concept, which is not directly ob- 
servable in the market place. For publicly traded 
companies stock price is observable, but the mar- 
ket’s expectation of future cash flows and cost of 
equity capital are not. As a result, neither compo- 
nent is directly observable from realized prices or 
returns. 
2.2. How is cost of equity capital measured? 
In the absence of a directly observable measure, 
cost of equity capital must be estimated, but be- 
cause it is difficult to estimate academics continue 
to actively debate the best method. One class of 
methods uses predetermined priced risk factors to 
yield explicit estimates of cost of equity capital. 
For example, the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) defines cost of equity capital as the risk 
free rate plus the market’s expected risk premium 
(Et(r,,, - rf)) (i.e. the price of risk) multiplied by the 
company’s amount of risk as measured by market 
beta (p). That is, 
( 3 )  
empirical tests of the CAPM is that it is not de- 
scriptive? It is now fairly well-accepted that risk 
factors other than market beta are priced. The 
Fama and French (1995) three-factor model ex- 
pands the set of risk factors to include the risks 
captured by firm size and market-to-book. 
Unfortunately, the three-factor model presents the 
same estimation problems described above. In ad- 
dition, the model is absent a theory to explain the 
nature of the non-diversifiable risks captured by 
firm size and market-to-book, and many question 
whether even this model is complete. 
Whether estimated using the CAPM or some 
other multifactor model, the resulting cost of equi- 
ty capital estimates are not useful to empiricists in- 
vestigating the link between disclosure and cost of 
equity capital. Because these models assume that 
the priced risk factors are known and limited to the 
factors in the model, the nature of the empirical re- 
lation between disclosure and cost of equity capi- 
tal is preordained. If the model does not include 
disclosure related risk as a priced risk factor, the 
relevant question becomes whether disclosure is 
related to any of the factors that are in the model. 
For example, since the CAPM limits the risk fac- 
tors to market beta, disclosure can impact cost of 
equity capital only if it impacts market beta. But, 
the hypothesis that more disclosure reduces mar- 
ket beta enjoys little theoretical support. 
A second class of methods broaches the cost of 
equity capital estimation problem by computing 
the internal rate of return that equates the market’s 
expectation of future cash flows to current stock 
price.3 In other words, these models estimate the 
cost of equity capital implied by equation (2) given 
current stock price and a proxy for future cash 
flows. As shown in equation (2) however, price re- 
flects an infinite series of expected future cash 
flows. To make the model tractable this series is 
truncated by inserting a terminal value that cap- 
tures cash flows beyond the forecast horizon. 
flows reside in this terminal value, successful de- 
one,s ability to discern the 
forecast. Alternative estimation methods deal with 
success. 
Using estimated values of the risk free rate, the 
company’s market beta and the risk premium, 
equation ( 3 )  can be used to estimate a value for r. 
Although this approach is popular in practice, its 
widespread use is not without controversy. First, 
one must estimate the market’s expected risk pre- 
mium because this forward looking metric is not 
directly observable. Users of the CAPM often em- 
pected value, but this imposes inter-temporal 
Moreover, the magnitude of the historical risk pre- 
mium is in dispute, as it is sensitive to the period 
estimates of the historical risk premium range 
from 7% to 9%7 but ‘laus and Thomas (2001) 
around 3%. Estimating a firm’s market beta is sim- 
ilarly fraught with difficulty. Estimates of the com- 
pany’s historical market beta are ~ n s i t i v e  to a 
number of factors including the estimator’s choice 
of (1) market index, (2) return interval, and ( 3 )  es- 
Ploy the premium to proxy for the ex- Since the majority of the expected future cash 
assumptions that may not be descriptive’ duction of cost of equity capital depends largely on 
terminal value . 
examined and the risk-free rate this issue differently and with varying degrees of 
Botosan and Plumlee (2005) (BP) assess the em- 
popular approaches for estimating cost of equity 
capital. BP conclude that two of the five approach- 
es produce cost of equity capital estimates that are 
argue that the equity risk premium has averaged pirical reliability of five of this literature’s most 
timation period. For a summary of this evidence see Fama and French 
Finally: even in the absence of any disagreement (2004). 
See for example, Botosan (1997), Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2001), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Gordon 
the Of the is question- and Gordon (1997), Code and Mohanram (2003) and Easton 
regarding the appropriate estimates for in the 
able. The overriding conclusion from numerous (2004). 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
related to various measures of risk in a theoretical- 
ly predictable and stable manner. One of the pre- 
ferred approaches is based on equation (2) directly 
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2002), and the other is 
based on the price-earnings growth (PEG) ratio, 
which is derived from equation (2) given certain 
assumptions (Easton, 2004). 
The estimates produced by this stream of litera- 
ture have proven more useful to researchers inves- 
tigating the link between disclosure and cost of 
equity capital than the estimates discussed previ- 
ously. It is established in the literature that at least 
two of the models produce estimates that capture 
cross-sectional variation in risk in a predictable 
manner (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005); an impor- 
tant first step in establishing construct validity. 
Moreover, these estimates are not a function of a 
predetermined set of priced risk factors, which 
makes them particularly useful to researchers en- 
deavouring to establish whether a particular type 
of risk is priced. 
Despite these advantages most agree that this ap- 
proach is not a panacea. Many models require an- 
alyst forecasts to proxy for the market’s beliefs 
about future cash flows, which introduces meas- 
urement error if the market and analysts hold dif- 
ferent beliefs! If the error is systematically related 
to the variables of interest conclusions drawn from 
the results could be misleading. It also limits the 
analysis to firms with an analyst following. In ad- 
dition, although existing research supports the va- 
lidity of the estimates generated by certain 
methods construct validity cannot be proven un- 
equivocally because ‘true’ cost of equity capital is 
not observable. Finally, it is questionable whether 
any particular firm’s point estimate of cost of eq- 
uity capital is correct. This is a significant draw- 
back from a practitioner’s perspective, but is much 
less of an issue from an academic’s perspective 
where capturing the cross-firm ranking in cost of 
equity capital is generally sufficient. 
2.3. Summary 
Given the difficulties involved in estimating 
cost of equity capital it is not surprising that a 
multitude of proxies are found in empirical re- 
search and that research into alternative methods 
continues. Existing research demonstrates that 
33 
certain estimates capture the cross-firm ranking of 
cost of equity capital reasonably well, but estab- 
lishing the reliability of the magnitude of the esti- 
mates is a more formidable problem. It is an 
important issue however, since in practical set- 
tings correctly capturing the magnitude of a given 
firm’s cost of equity capital is paramount. Even 
so, the progress academic research has achieved 
has permitted empirical disclosure research to ad- 
vance.s I summarise the findings of these empiri- 
cal studies in Section 4,  but before doing so I 
review the theories that underlie them in the next 
section of the paper. 
‘The use of analysts’ forecasts to proxy for the market’s ex- 
pectations is standard in many branches of empirical account- 
ing and finance research, however. 
Throughout this review I use the phrase ‘disclosure re- 
search’ to refer narrowly to the body of literature that investi- 
gates the link between disclosure and cost of equity capital as 
opposed to the much broader complete body of disclosure re- 
search. 
‘See Klein and Bawa (1976), Barry and Brown (1985), 
Coles and Loewenstein (1988), Handa and Linn (1993) and 
Coles et al. (1995). 
3. The theoretical link between disclosure 
and cost of equity capital 
A sizeable body of theoretical research supports a 
link between information and the cost of equity 
capital. One stream of research suggests that infor- 
mation reduces cost of equity capital by reducing 
investors’ estimation risk. Another stream of re- 
search suggests that information reduces cost of 
equity capital by reducing information asymmetry 
and/or transaction costs. In the following para- 
graphs I briefly summarise the main findings of 
this literature and highlight open research ques- 
tions. 
3.1. Estimation risk and cost of equity capital 
The literature characterises ‘estimation risk’ as 
an additional element of risk that arises because 
investors are uncertain about the parameters of a 
security’s return or payoff distribution. Because 
investors estimate the parameters based on avail- 
able information, their confidence level depends 
on the attributes of their information set. This 
literature reaches two conclusions that are particu- 
larly relevant for disclosure research. First, estima- 
tion risk is non-diversifable such that cost of 
equity capital is higher for low information (i.e. 
high estimation risk) securities .6 Second, tradition- 
al analysis of optimal portfolio choice and equilib- 
rium pricing ignores estimation risk by treating the 
estimated parameters as if they are true. As a re- 
sult, estimation risk is not captured by market beta. 
The basic idea conveyed in these studies is illus- 
trated by the following simple example. Two 
firms, Firm A and Firm B, have the same expected 
payoff, but differ in terms of the amount of infor- 
mation available to investors. Investors are confi- 
dent of their predictions regarding Firm A’s future 
payoff because ample information is available 
about the firm. In contrast, little information is 
available about Firm B, and as a result investors 
are quite uncertain about their predictions for this 
firm. The CAPM treats the expected payoff for 
both firms as if ‘true’ and ignores investors’ differ- 
ential uncertainty with regards to their predictions. 
Consequently the CAPM provides no role for in- 
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34 
vestors’ uncertainty in determining their optimal 
portfolio choice or the equilibrium pricing of secu- 
rities. In contrast, the literature cited above explic- 
itly incorporates investors’ uncertainty into the 
model and concludes that in equilibrium securities 
with greater estimation risk gamer lower stock 
prices, all else equal. 
The ongoing debate in this literature centres on 
whether estimation risk is diversifiable (i.e. not 
priced) or non-diversifiable (i .e. priced). Ultimately 
this debate spurred Clarkson et al. (1996) to con- 
clude that ‘the extent of the impact of estimation 
risk remains, fundamentally, an empirical ques- 
tion’. (p.79) 
3.2. Transaction costs, information asymmetry 
and cost of equity capital 
Another stream of research suggests that in- 
vestors pay less for stocks with high transaction 
costs, which renders a higher cost of equity capi- 
tal. Many of these studies link higher transaction 
costs to information asymmetry and/or market 
illiquidity. For example, Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986) argue that cost of equity capital is greater 
for securities with larger bid-ask spreads.’ Amihud 
and Mendelson (1 988) forge the link to disclosure 
by recommending that managers disclose their pri- 
vate information to reduce their bid-ask spread and 
cost of equity capital. This recommendation and 
the reasons for it are echoed in King et al. (1990) 
who argue that disclosure reduces investors’ in- 
centives to acquire costly private information. 
Further, Diamond and Verrecchia ( 199 1 ) contend 
that because disclosure reduces the amount of in- 
formation revealed by a trade, disclosure reduces 
the adverse price impact of large trades. This 
prompts investors to amass larger stock holdings 
than they otherwise would, which increases de- 
mand and stock price, and reduces the cost of eq- 
uity capital.8 
A recent paper by Easley and O’Hara (2004) 
(EO) extends the literature on the link between in- 
formation asymmetry and cost of equity capital. 
Specifically, EO examine the impact of several at- 
tributes of information on cost of equity capital: 
the proportion of the information set that is pri- 
vate; the dispersion of private information across 
traders; and the combined precision of public and 
private information. Their model is characterised 
by uninformed investors who require compensa- 
tion for expected losses from transacting with in- 
formed investors. Although uninformed investors 
cannot directly observe the private information 
held by informed investors, they can partially dis- 
cern it from stock price. In addition, investors de- 
mand more of securities about which they are 
informed. 
Because of the additional compensation required 
by uninformed investors, cost of equity capital is 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
higher for firms with a larger proportion of private 
information. But if private information is more 
widely dispersed, a larger number of informed in- 
vestors demand the stock. This reduces cost of eq- 
uity capital because greater demand increases 
stock price. In addition, when private information 
is more widely dispersed it is impounded into 
stock price with greater precision. This reduces the 
additional compensation required by the unin- 
formed investors, which further reduces cost of eq- 
uity capital. Finally, uninformed investors require 
less additional compensation when the public in- 
formation they observe directly, and the private in- 
formation they discern from stock price, are more 
precise. Accordingly, greater precision also re- 
duces cost of equity capital. 
Many of the conclusions in this literature rest on 
the critical assumption that public disclosure miti- 
gates information asymmetry by displacing private 
information. Often this assumption is implicit, al- 
though in some research (e.g. Easley and O’Hara 
(2004)) it is explicitly stated. Although it seems in- 
tuitive that greater public disclosure reduces infor- 
mation asymmetry, Verrecchia (200 1) notes that 
neither theory nor extant empirical evidence un- 
ambiguously supports this assumption? For exam- 
ple Lundholm (1 988) shows that when the errors 
in the public and private signals are sufficiently 
correlated public and private information comple- 
ment each other. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) con- 
clude that public disclosure might be processed 
into private information by informed investors. 
Kim and Verreccchia (1 991) suggest that informed 
investors increase the precision of their private in- 
formation more than less informed investors in re- 
sponse to an increase in the precision of public 
information; and McNichols and Trueman (1 994) 
extend this finding to short-horizon investors ac- 
quiring private information in anticipation of a 
public information release. 
3.3. Summary and concluding observations 
All else equal, investors prefer securities with 
low estimation risk, low transaction costs and/or 
less information asymmetry. Since demand is 
greater for securities with these characteristics, 
stock prices are higher and cost of equity capital is 
See also Demsetz (1968), Copeland and Galai (1983) and 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985). 
When reduced information asymmetry results in a rapid 
exit from market-making the opposite result obtains. 
However, the authors describe the conditions that give rise to 
this result as ‘less typical.’ 
For differing theoretical perspectives on this question, see 
Verrecchia (1982), Diamond (1985), Bushman (199 I ) ,  
Lundholm (199 I ) ,  Alles and Lundholm (1993), Lundholm 
(1988), Kim and Verrecchia (1991 and 1994) and McNichols 
and Trueman (1994). See Callahan, Lee and Yohn (1997) or 
Botosan, Plumlee and Xie (2004) for more discussion of this 
point. 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
lower for such firms. If disclosure mitigates esti- 
mation risk, transaction costs and/or information 
asymmetry, a negative relation exists between dis- 
closure and cost of equity capital. 
Certain issues with implications for this hypoth- 
esis remain open, however. If estimation risk is 
not priced, greater disclosure does not reduce cost 
of equity capital through this avenue. Moreover, if 
in some circumstances, disclosure leads to greater 
information asymmetry, a positive association be- 
tween disclosure and cost of equity capital could be 
observed. Thus, it is an empirical question whether 
the negative association purported to exist in theo- 
ry between disclosure and cost of equity is ob- 
served in the market. The next section of the paper 
reviews the relevant empirical literature. 
35 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) de- 
cision to require segment disclosures on nondiver- 
sifiable risk (market beta) and total risk (the 
standard deviation of returns). Relative to a sample 
of unaffected firms, DSV show that total risk de- 
clined for firms initiating disclosure, but their re- 
sults regarding non-diversifiable risk are mixed. 
Prodhan and Harris (1989) (PH) examine a 
similar question around the adoption of SFAS No. 
14: Financial Reporting for  Segments of a 
Business Enterprise. Unlike DSV, PH find that 
nondiversifiable risk (market beta) declined for 
firms initiating geographic segment disclosure 
relative to firms not affected by the standard. This 
result supports the hypothesis that greater disclo- 
sure reduces cost of equity capital, if market beta 
is a reasonable proxy for the type of non-diversi- 
fiable risk that is mitigated by disclosure. This 
supposition is problematic, however. As dis- 
cussed earlier, the overriding conclusion in the 
literature is that the CAPM is not descriptive,l0 
and theory suggests that market beta does not 
capture estimation risk. A weak link between es- 
timation risk and market beta might explain why 
this literature documents mixed results with re- 
spect to the association between disclosure and 
market beta. 
The analysis of total risk as measured by the 
standard deviation of returns bypasses this prob- 
lem. But even if disclosure reduces total risk, dis- 
closure might not reduce cost of equity capital. 
The mitigated component of total risk might be di- 
versifiable in nature, which is not price if investor 
behaviour accords with theory. Thus while the re- 
sults of these early studies are provocative they are 
far from definitive. 
4. The empirical link between disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital 
A growing body of empirical research investi- 
gates the association between disclosure and cost 
of equity capital using a variety of research meth- 
ods. Most studies employ archival empirical data, 
but some are conducted in the laboratory. Most 
examine the association between disclosure and 
the cost of equity capital, but limited evidence 
concerning the cost of debt capital exists. Some 
studies side-step the problem of estimating cost 
of equity capital by investigating managers’ re- 
porting practices when raising capital. Other 
studies achieve the same result by examining 
variables expected to be related to cost of equity 
capital (i.e. indirect measures), while another 
branch of the literature attempts to link disclosure 
to the cost of equity capital estimates (i.e. direct 
measures) discussed in Section 2. In this section 
I review the findings of this varied body of re- 
search. 
4.1. Indirect measures of cost of equity capital 
4.1 . I .  Proxies for priced risk 
Early research investigates the association be- 
tween disclosure and cost of equity capital using 
measures of risk. Total security risk is comprised 
of diversifiable and non-diversifiable risk, but 
since theory suggests that only non-diversifiable 
risk is priced measures of this type of risk are the 
most relevant. Even so, some research employs 
measures of total risk, arguing that contrary to 
theory investors might also price diversifiable 
risk. 
Researchers often use the standard deviation of 
returns to proxy for total risk, but separating total 
risk into diversifiable and non-diversifiable risk is 
difficult. Many studies assume that the CAPM is 
descriptive and use market beta to proxy for non- 
diversifiable risk. For example, Dhaliwal et al. 
(1979) (DSV) investigate the impact of the 
4 .I .2. Proxies for transaction costs andlor 
information asymmetry 
More recent studies examine the relation be- 
tween disclosure and cost of equity capital using 
proxies for transaction costs and/or information 
asymmetry. A number of alternative proxies are 
employed in these studies including: relative 
spreads (the bid-ask spread deflated by stock 
price), share turnover (trading volume scaled by 
shares outstanding), and standard deviation of re- 
turns .’ ’ 
Greenstein and Sami (1994) (GS) re-examine 
the impact of the SEC’s segment disclosure re- 
quirement on cost of equity capital using the rela- 
tive spread. Compared to a sample of unaffected 
firms, GS find that relative spreads declined for 
firms initiating disclosure. Similarly, Welker 
(1 995) finds that firms with higher Association for 
l o  For a discussion of the CAPM controversy see 
” As discussed above the standard deviation of returns is 
Lakonishok (1993). 
also used as a proxy for total risk. 
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Investment Management and Research (AIMR) 
disclosure scores enjoy lower relative spreads.I2 
Healy et al. (1999) (HHP) examine 97 f i i s  with 
a large and sustained increase in their AIMR dis- 
closure scores and document a decline in relative 
spreads coincident with improved disclosure prac- 
tices. HHP also document increases in stock price, 
analyst and institutional investor following, and 
increased use of public financing for these firms. 
These latter results provide additional evidence of 
improved market liquidity and/or reduced infor- 
mation asymmetry following an improvement in 
disclosure practices. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) (LV) and Mohd 
(2005) examine changes in information asymme- 
try around a change in accounting standards. Both 
studies employ relative spread and share turnover 
in their analyses to proxy for information asym- 
metry. LV investigate whether information asym- 
metry declines for German firms that voluntarily 
embrace a higher standard of disclosure by adopt- 
ing International Accounting Standards (IAS) or 
US generally accepted accounting principles (US 
GAAP).13 Mohd focuses on the adoption of SFAS 
No. 86: Accounting for Sofhyare Development 
Costs. Mohd investigates whether the flexibility to 
capitalise or expense software development costs 
afforded by the standard allows managers to com- 
municate their superior information concerning fu- 
ture benefits. Over time and relative to a sample of 
f m s  not impacted by the change in accounting 
standards, both studies conclude that relative 
spreads decline and share turnover increases for 
adopting firms.14 
The studies discussed in the preceding para- 
graphs provide evidence that greater disclosure is 
associated with lower transaction costs and re- 
duced information asymmetry. If, as theory sug- 
gests, cost of equity capital is less for securities 
with lower transaction costs or less information 
asymmetry, these studies suggest that greater dis- 
closure is associated with a lower cost of equity 
capital. 
Several research design issues could have impli- 
cations for the reliability of this conclusion, how- 
ever. Using the bid-ask spread to proxy for 
information asymmetry can be problematic be- 
cause the spread incorporates inventory holding 
and order processing costs, which are unrelated to 
information asymmetry. Empirical studies suggest 
that less than half of the total spread is comprised 
of information costs (George et al., 1991 and Stoll, 
1989). 
Despite this, most studies use the total spread be- 
cause isolating the information cost component is 
computationally difficult and measurement error 
in the total spread biases against finding an associ- 
ation between disclosure and information asym- 
metry. Chiyachantana et al. (2004) (CJTW) is an 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
exception. CJTW find that post-Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (FD) the information cost component 
of the spread measured just prior to firms’ quarter- 
ly earnings announcements declined. This sug- 
gests that Regulation FD achieved its goal of 
leveling the informational playing field, at least 
prior to earnings  announcement^.'^ 
Because relative spread is the absolute spread 
deflated by stock price, a change in the relative 
spread reflects changes in the absolute spread or 
stock price or both. Berk (1995) argues that riskier 
firms tend to have lower market values because 
their future cash flows are discounted at higher 
costs of equity capital. If stock price and risk are 
negatively related, disclosure improvements that 
reduce estimation risk, increase stock price and de- 
crease the relative spread even if information 
asymmetry remains unaffected. Even more trou- 
bling is the concern that relative spread might still 
decline when both information asymmetry and es- 
timation risk are held constant. This is because 
stock price is also a function of future cash flows, 
such that a decline in relative spread might simply 
reflect an increase in stock price due to an increase 
in the market’s expectation of future cash flows. 
For example, Lang and Lundholm (1993) find 
that AIMR disclosure scores are positively related 
to firm performance. If the voluntary improve- 
ments in disclosure examined in Healy et al. 
(1999) (HHP) are related to improved perform- 
ance, upward revisions in the market’s expectation 
of future cash flows could lead to a decline in rel- 
ative spread even if estimation risk and informa- 
tion asymmetry are held constant.16 HHP include 
contemporaneous earnings in their analyses to 
control for firm performance, but this control vari- 
able might not capture the extent of the market’s 
revision of expected cash flows. 
The last point in the preceding paragraph high- 
l2 Up until 1996 the AIMR produced annual rankings of the 
quality of the corporate disclosure practices of select firms be- 
longing to a diverse group of industries. In addition to provid- 
ing rankings of overall disclosure quality, the AIMR produced 
three category scores: (1) annual report, (2) quarterly and 
other reports, and (3) investor relations activities. Welker lim- 
its his analysis to the overall disclosure score. 
l3 In a subsequent study, Leuz (2003) partitions the sample 
between the IAS adopters and the US GAAP adopters. Leuz 
finds no differences in information asymmetry between the 
two groups and concludes that IAS and US GAAP are similar 
in quality. 
l 4  LV also examine the standard deviation of returns, but do 
not document any significant results with this metric. 
l5 The SEC imposed Regulation Fair Disclosure effective 
23 October 2000. It prohibits selective disclosure of material 
information to specific entities unless the issuer also simulta- 
neously releases the information to the public. It is intended to 
level the informational playing field in terms of access to in- 
formation. 
l6 This discussion also applies to studies that examine the 
cross-sectional association between relative spread and disclo- 
sure level. 
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lights a final research design issue that could have 
implications for the reliability of the conclusions 
drawn from some of the voluntary disclosure stud- 
ies discussed in this section: self-selection bias. 
Managers select disclosure practices in response 
to specific incentives. If the variables that explain 
managers’ disclosure decisions also explain the 
proxies for information asymmetry/transaction 
costs employed in the analysis, a correlated omit- 
ted variable biases could confound the results. For 
example, 86% of Leuz and Verrecchia’s (2000) 
sample of adopting firms listed on the London 
(LSE) or New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as 
compared to only 19% of the German GAAP 
f m s .  Since listing on the LSE or NYSE is associ- 
ated with lower relative spreads and increased 
share turnover, it is difficult to determine whether 
LV’s results reflect improved disclosure or ex- 
change listing. 
LV address this problem by modelling the dis- 
closure decision and controlling for the self-selec- 
tion bias (see also Welker, 1995 and Mohd, 2005). 
But, if the disclosure decision model is incomplete 
this approach fails to resolve the problem. Other 
studies deal with the issue by examining changes 
in disclosure. Healy et al. (1999) state, ‘By using 
each firm as its own control, our time-series 
approach mitigates these potential [omitted vari- 
ables] problems.’ (p. 489) However, in his discus- 
sion of the Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) study Joos 
(2000) counters this claim. He states: ‘...event 
tests mitigate the correlated omitted variable prob- 
lem best when the event is exogenously imposed, 
no other changes occur in the event window, and 
the windows are short. ...[ Otherwise] time-series 
tests do not completely control for the correlated 
omitted variable bias problem.’ (p. 134) 
31 
4.3. Direct measures of cost of equity capital 
The research discussed in this section of the 
paper uses the cost of equity capital estimates de- 
scribed in Section 2 to proxy for cost of equity 
capital. Since these estimates have been developed 
relatively recently (post- 1995), this literature com- 
prises a small but growing segment of disclosure 
research. Botosan (1997) examines the relation be- 
tween self-constructed, annual report disclosure 
scores, and the cost of equity capital estimates im- 
plied by equation (2). She uses analysts’ forecasts 
of future cash flows and terminal price at the fore- 
cast horizon to proxy for the market’s expecta- 
tion.17 Botosan finds that greater disclosure is 
associated with a lower cost of equity capital, but 
her analysis is limited to one industry and year, 
and holds only for firms lightly followed by ana- 
lysts. Subsequent research extends Botosan’s ini- 
tial finding to samples comprised of lightly 
followed Canadian firms (Richardson and Welker, 
2001) (RW), Swiss firms (Hail, 2002), European 
and non-European banks (Poshakwale and 
Courtis, 2005), and heavily followed US f m s  
across a broad spectrum of industries (Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002). Altogether the results of these 
studies provide a growing body of evidence that 
supports a negative association between annual re- 
port disclosure level and cost of equity capital. 
The results presented in two of the five studies 
(RW and Hail, 2002) must be discounted however, 
because the authors employ Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
(GLS) estimates to proxy for the cost of equity 
capital. It is now well-documented in the literature 
that these estimates are not related to risk in a rea- 
sonable manner, calling into question their validi- 
ty as a proxy for cost of equity capital. For 
example, RW state that they exclude market beta, 
market value of equity, and book-to-market ratios 
4.2. Managers ’ reporting behaviours when raising (i.e. the FamaFrench three factors) from their 
analyses because ‘Gebhardt et al. document that capital 
they are statistically unrelated to our measure of This literature links disclosure to cost of capital 
the cost of equity capital’. (p. 609) Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005) find that the GLS estimates are by examining whether managers are more forth- coming with voluntary information when they ac- positively or negatively related to market beta, de- cess the capital market. Using a self-constructed pending on the other risk factors included in the disclosure index related to the annual report, Choi model, and that in some specifications the esti- (1973) finds that firms significantly improve their mates are positively related to size and nega- financial disclosure upon entry into the Eurobond tively related to growth, contrary to expectations. 
increased use of public financing by firms with of construct validity for one,s ability to draw 
large and sustained increases in AIMR disclosure 
cessing the capital markets provide more frequent 
management earnings forecasts. Finally, Lang and 
hndholm (2000) conclude that firms that increase 
their disclosure level in anticipation of a stock of- 
fering experience price increases prior to the offer- 
ing. ~ 1 1  of these studies document results which 
suggest that managers act as if greater 
reduces cost of capital. 
market. Healy et al* ( 1999) document This discussion highlights the critical importance 
meaningful conclusions from empirical analysis. scores* Frankel et (1995) find that managers ac- The issue of self-selection bias discussed earlier 
Botosan actually employs the residual income valuation 
(RIV) model when estimating cost of equity capital, but pro- 
vided the clean surplus relation holds the RIV model produces 
estimates identical to those produced by the approach outlined 
in the text. Analysis in Botosan and Plumlee (2005) confirms 
that the estimates produced by the two approaches are virtual- 
ly identical. 
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tional research is needed to further our under- 
standing of the impact of different types of disclo- 
sure on cost of equity capital. 
The Botosan and Plumlee (2002) finding of a 
positive association between cost of equity capital 
and quarterly report scores is contrary to theoreti- 
cal predictions. Measurement error in the proxies 
or correlated omitted variables might explain this 
counter-intuitive result, but it is also possible that 
the relationships among disclosure, firms’ infor- 
mation environments and cost of equity capital are 
more complicated than those captured by existing 
theories. Early research findings suggest that cer- 
tain types of public disclosure (e.g. quarterly earn- 
ings announcements) generate private information 
(see Barron et al., 2005 and Botosan et al., 2004). 
If so, some public disclosures might result in in- 
creased information asymmetry and a higher cost 
of equity capital. Alternatively, Bushee and Noe 
(2000) find that transient institutional investors are 
particularly attracted to quarterly report disclo- 
sures. Because transient institutional investors 
trade aggressively on short-term earnings news, 
their trading activities can have a detrimental ef- 
fect on stock return volatility. If the market equates 
greater volatility with greater priced risk, provid- 
ing greater quarterly report disclosures could have 
an unexpected investor clientele effect that mani- 
fests in a higher cost of equity capital. Given the 
important role cost of equity capital plays in the al- 
location of resources among and within firms, ad- 
ditional research is needed to resolve this issue. 
also applies to this stream of literature and could 
confound the results of these studies. Hail (2002: 
747) states, ‘companies that opt for a high disclo- 
sure environment might differ from those that do 
not in terms of f m  characteristics and hence may 
have lower costs of capital regardless.’ Few stud- 
ies address this concern by modelling the disclo- 
sure decision and controlling for the self-selection 
bias directly, due to the difficulty of adequately 
modelling the disclosure decision. It is also ques- 
tionable whether the potential for correlated omit- 
ted variables is mitigated by examining the 
association between changes in disclosure and cost 
of equity capital since voluntary changes in disclo- 
sure are endogenous. However, if the change in 
disclosure is externally imposed, this approach 
might prove fruitful. Finally, it is important to note 
that self-selection bias is problematic only if the 
firm characteristics referred to by Hail are related 
to one or more priced risks not controlled for in the 
analysis. Thus the potential impact of self-selec- 
tion bias is mitigated to the extent that these stud- 
ies control for known risk factors and include 
market value of equity or book-to-price in the 
analysis to control for any remaining unmeasured 
risk (Berk, 1995).’* 
Another issue that could confound the results of 
these studies is the existence of other avenues of 
disclosure not included in the analysis. Botosan 
(1997) identifies this as a possible explanation for 
her inability to document a significant association 
between annual report disclosure level and cost of 
equity capital for heavily followed firms. 
Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) (GI) test Gietzmann 
and Trombetta’s (2003) theory that accounting 
policy choice is a correlated omitted variable with 
implications for the conclusions drawn in existing 
disclosure research. But GI employ the Gebhardt 
et al. (2001) estimates in their analysis, which ren- 
ders their results difficult to interpret. 
If disclosure is positively correlated across dif- 
ferent disclosure avenues and the excluded disclo- 
sure is negatively (or unrelated) to cost of equity 
capital, a lack of completeness in the disclosure 
measure is not a significant problem. The first con- 
dition appears to be met. Lang and Lundholm 
(1 993) (LL) document significant correlations 
among AIMR disclosure rankings of annual re- 
ports, other publications and investor relations 
disclosures, suggesting that firms’ disclosure be- 
haviours are similar across alternative avenues. 
The second condition is more problematic, howev- 
er. Although most of this research documents a 
negative association between disclosure level and 
cost of equity capital, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) 
document a positive association with the AIMR 
quarterly report score.I9 This finding suggests that 
certain types of omitted disclosures might produce 
a correlated omitted variable bias and that addi- 
4.4. Disclosure and cost of equity capital in the 
laboratory 
Bloomfield and Wilks (2000) examine the rela- 
tion between disclosure quality and liquidity, and 
cost of equity capital in an experimental market 
setting. They find that stock prices are enhanced 
when investors receive a larger number of inform- 
ative signals about the value of a security. 
Investors who face less payoff uncertainty are 
willing to buy at higher prices, all else equal, 
thereby yielding a lower cost of equity capital to 
the firm. 
4.5. Disclosure and the cost of debt capital 
Sengupta (1998) addresses the association be- 
tween disclosure level and the cost of debt capital. 
l 8  Unfortunately controlling for market value of equity (or 
book-to-price) can be problematic since the positive correla- 
tion that exists between market value of equity and disclosure 
levels can induce multicollinearity that reduces the statistical 
power of the analysis. 
l9 Richardson and Welker (2001) also document a positive 
association between social disclosure level and cost of equity 
capital, however this result may be related to their use of GLS 
estimates to proxy for cost of equity capital. Moreover, as RW 
point out, social disclosures might be motivated by reasons 
other than the desire to minimise cost of capital. 
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Sengupta documents a negative association be- 
tween AIMR overall disclosure scores and two al- 
ternative measures of the cost of debt collected 
from Moody S Bond Surveys. Sengupta’s results 
support the hypothesis that greater disclosure re- 
duces the cost of debt. 
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5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper reviews the literature that relates tradi- 
tional concepts of ‘disclosure’ to cost of capital. 
Excluded from my review is a relatively new 
stream of academic research that broadens the con- 
cept of disclosure to include other attributes of in- 
formation such as earnings quality (e.g. Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2004, Hribar and 
Jenkins, 2004 and Mikhail et al., 2004), and the 
precision, dissemination, and composition of the 
information set (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). 
Similar to the research reviewed herein, these 
studies generally find that the information envi- 
ronment and managers’ financial reporting choices 
impact cost of equity capital. 
From my review of the literature, I draw the fol- 
lowing observations and suggestions for future re- 
search. First, academic research has made 
significant progress in estimating cost of equity 
capital, and this has allowed empirical disclosure 
research to progress. Even so, additional research 
is needed to advance the state of the art for practi- 
tioners and academics. Second, extant theory 
strongly supports the hypothesis that greater dis- 
closure reduces cost of equity capital. However, 
the assumption that public disclosure mitigates in- 
formation asymmetry, which underpins some of 
this literature, is worthy of additional considera- 
tion in light of early stage empirical evidence that 
public and private information act as complements 
in some circumstances. Third, while no one aca- 
demic study is perfect, the sum total of the evi- 
dence accumulated across many studies using 
alternative measures, samples and research de- 
signs lends considerable support to the hypothesis 
that greater disclosure reduces cost of equity capi- 
tal. Still, additional research might explain certain 
anomalous results in the literature (e.g. the positive 
association between timely disclosure level and 
cost of equity capital). 
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